Security Santa's Best Book List:

-Stormtroop Tactics by Bruce Gudmundsson

How the Germans learned lessons and formed teams that essentially taught the average infantryman to fight in WWI. A great read, especially if you like the details of how the wartime German Army functioned. A well written read as well.

On War

Well, of course! A classic work that the Army has internalized.


Street Without Joy

The classic COIN book about fighting the Viet Minh.

Zulu Rising by Ian Knight


THE definitive work on the 1879 Zulu War. Come for Rourke's Drift, stay for Ulundi.

Zinky Boys

The Soviets suffered the same issues as the US after Vietnam. Zinky Boys illustrates the fallout among Soviet veterans of Afghanistan. Despite the US involvement since 2001, we really never did study the Soviets.


Cannonball by Brock Yates

Yes, the movie was based off the book, and nearly every character is mirrored in the book. The Cannonball Memorial Coast to Coast Race was about two things: sticking to the 55mph speed limit and seeing how fast you could go. An amazing work that any decent security wannabe will want to read for the subversion alone.

Tommy by Richard Holmes.

The definitive single volume on the British soldier in WWI. Soldiering never changes. A great read as we draw to a close of the centennial.

For Country and Corps: A life of OP Smith by Gayle Schisler

OP Smith is perhaps the most underrated CO in American military history. He was everything that you want in a CO. 

Thunder and Flames: Americans in the Crucible of Combat, 1917-1918

A examination of the AEF in training and combat. Very illuminating and breaks the myth of the AEF acting as a savior to the embattled French and British.

Small States in the International System

Yes, I included my co-authored book on here. It covers small conflicts not often discussed, such as the Sino-Vietnamese War and the Chaco. It's expensive, so ask your friendly librarian to order it!

Who would have ever thought that I could combine my love of professional wrestling and politics into one convenient package? I suppose I'm highly educated but that does not, and will never, affect my love of pro wrestling. Wrestling is, essentially, a soap opera for men. Storylines play out over the course of a few weeks. Heels (bad guys) feud with faces (good guys) and their continued friction is a sure way to make money. And that's what wrestling is, a business. If you can't make money you either try something else or get out. The drive for more business puts "asses in seats", sets up pay-per-views (pioneered by Vince McMahon) and generally can make or break how a individual wrestler is employed. One minute you are the hot ticket in the "squared circle" the next you're losing to newbies in matches nobody sees nor cares about. It's a fickle business, one that is tied to a carnival atmosphere not matter how serious people try to make it. Put on a good show, a good spectacle, and you will score a payoff. Put on a poor show and you could endanger everything.

When Donald Trump first announced his campaign for the Presidency I laughed. I had too. Trump's business is his name, his brand and part of that brand was a payout from the 2009 "Battle of the Billionaires"  pitted against Vince McMahon, then evil CEO of the WWE. Believe it or not Trump was the face, the good guy, who would take down VinnieMac once and for all. In essence, as I watch the RNC, I see a pro-wrestler as a potential President. Now wrestlers are no stranger to politics. Jesse Ventura ran Minnesota for four years after a multi-candidate election that saw him take the top spot with far less than 50% of the vote.   Nikolai Volkoff (Josip Nikolai Peruzović), a wrestler billed as being from the Soviet Union, ran for a commissioner's position in Baltimore Country, Maryland. Vince McMahon's wife, Linda, who has appeared many times in the ring, ran for Senate in Connecticut. While the latter two failed, Ventura won, in part to college students voting for him because that's the name they knew.

Wrestling and politics have a long history. Often the characters many wrestlers adapt in the ring are reflections of contemporary events. Evil Soviet wrestlers, evil Nazi wrestlers, evil Iranian (and later Iraqi) wrestlers and even evil environmentalist wrestlers all provided good fodder for names like Hulk Hogan (a REAL American), Hillbilly Jim, "Macho Man" Randy Savage and others. One important group of characters is the evil rich guy persona. Ted Dibiase, the "Million Dollar Man" did a fantastic job of angering crowds with his arrogant rich guy act. Irwin R. Shyster (IRS, get it?) would accuse the audience of trying to skip on their taxes. Vince McMahon after his feud with Steve Austin became the boss everyone loved to hate. He pulled fantastic money in pitting "every-man" Austin against him and his minions, all of which groveled to him to keep their jobs.

So where does Trump fit into all this? I've been telling people that throughout the primary campaign that Trump was a level above his competitors. He would make fun of them, cut them off and generally act in a way that was outside the decorum of even cut-throat primary politics. His debate performances were rarely delivered with facts. In fact, to me, they seemed like wrestling promos before a match, where wrestlers tell people how awsesome they are and how they will smash their opponent. A good promo is an art form and wrestlers like Ric Flair and Hulk Hogan perfected the promo. A good verbal destruction of your opponent does wonders to fire up the crowd and make your opposite number look weak and unprepared. Trump rarely presents specifics for his plans and, frankly, he doesn't have to. He just needs to win the crowd with a damn good show.

If Hilary is going to win this November her campaign needs to understand one thing: they're not dealing with a politician. They're dealing with a showman who knows how to play the emotions of the crowd. That's why the rest of the Primary field was left in the dust as Trump rolled up damn near ever Republican primary and caucus. He knows the right promo to deliver at the right time while jabbing his opponents in such a way that make people swoon over him. The Republic National Convention is occurring even as I type this and is proving to be a mutated love child of the GOP and pro-wrestling. The first two days echoed Vince MacMahon's idea that any celebrity is good celebrity. I have not heard the words "Scott Biao" used this much in twenty years. Doesn't matter if they're has-beens. Use them is the McMahon slogan.

Trump is taking a page from the WWE/McMahon playbook. Spectacle is necessary to draw people in and promote yourself, no matter what. I honestly would not be surprised that events like his wife's plagiarism of Michelle Obama's speech wasn't fabricated to draw attention. What purpose would it serve? In a good wrestling story line, bringing your spouse into the fray and defending her is good copy, just see "Macho Man" Randy Savage and his marriage to Ms. Elizabeth in the 1980s after Macho Man defended her on a weekly bases from bad guys like Andre the Giant. Huge ratings and big bucks for the WWE and Vince McMahon was the result. Behind every door is an angle that can make money, and I don't think for a second Trump is going to ignore the potential for such massive exposure for his name and capital.

Fear not Iran

The buzz to use military power to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear state is in full swing. The 13, March opinion piece by Joshua Muravchik advocates total war with Iran and believes that a use of force will undermine the regime. Studying the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war should leave some doubt in one’s mind about the wisdom of attacking Iran. Compound this with the American reasoning and experience in Iraq and it’s difficult to see why anybody would support the notion to wage total war on Iran over their nuclear program. 

Scaring the public about Iran has become a pastime of sorts in certain policy circles in the US and abroad recently. In fact if you replace “Iran” with “Iraq”  the arguments closely resemble each other. However in this case there is not a 9/11 scale event driving public support. In a recent document leak it has been suggested that Iran’s capability is nowhere near what the policy wonks have been advertising and won’t be for quite some time.

Muravchik believes that an attack will divide and inspire an already present Iranian opposition. Saddam Hussein believed the exact same thing in 1980. The Iraqi invasion of Iran actually united a people that were on the verge of a second revolution to replace the theocracy that took the place of the Shah. While Muravhick cites some vague examples of people turning their back on regimes the evidence suggests that the opposite is true: that invasions by outsiders unite a fractured society. Iranian propaganda is quite anti-US and while there is a significant portion of people who do not support the theocracy counting on them to support a US invasion is a fool’s errand that is asking for trouble. 

Iran is also very good at producing weapons for propaganda purposes. Their domestic arms industry is fairly robust when it comes to basic military equipment but the production of more advanced technology is almost certainly smoke and mirrors. The F-313 stealth fighter Iran debuted had an instrument panel seemingly built with a quick shopping trip to the Garmin website. Their newest fighter, the Saeghe-2, looks suspiciously like the US produced F-5 Tiger II that was exported from the US to Iran in the days of the Shah. To believe that they have the capability to build a nuclear weapon in six months almost seems like buying into propaganda, a dangerous precedent for anybody. 

 The mismanagement of the occupation by elements within the Bush administration and the military’s inability to formulate a cohesive strategy in Iraq make me wonder if they could manage anything in Iran, presuming that the US does not get bogged down in a destructive war against a determined conventional force. The same people who mismanaged the initial occupation are still in policy circles and still have powerful voices. The calls for war are ridiculous in the face of an Iran that is changing, albeit slowly, and seeking to reenter the international community on a greater scale. War would only reaffirm the anti-US and anti-western propaganda doled out by the regime. Diplomacy is, in the case, the best hope for a non-nuclear Iran. Don’t let people with PhDs argue for total war unless they volunteer to go first.

Logisitcs in Small Wars: Fighting on a budget

The old adage that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics is never more clearly expressed than in small conflict. The ability to support the force on the battlefield plays a vital, perhaps the most vital, role in achieving victory or suffering defeat. Logistics can be defined as “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied” (Van Creveld 1994). This deceptively simple phrasing masks the incredible effort that moving and supplying armies that small states face. Bravery on the battlefield matters little if the most basic elements of human need are ignored, not to mention munitions and supplies for the weapons of war. As Rommel found in North Africa, battlefield victory brings an increased need to find new points of supply. When the Africa Corps was forced to stretch already weak supply chains the opening for Allied victory appeared. In wars between small states the ability to move and supply armies is critical but often left behind in the acquisition of better military technology and larger armies. 

Most small states face a stark choice: supply your armies or improve your armies. The ability for an army to live off the land disappeared in 1914 with ever increasing demand for fuel, food and munitions to feed the art of modern warfare (Van Creveld 1994). For many leaders the choice is obvious but the underlying danger means that any stated goals must be achieved quickly before a tenuous supply line is outpaced. This rarely occurs and the failure many small states experience in achieving stated war goals can be traced directly to poor logistics. 

The Chaco War and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict demonstrate that raw manpower and more numerous but less advanced technology matters little if they cannot be adequately supplied. The focus of the Chaco War, the Chaco region between Paraguay and Bolivia, was an arid wasteland devoid of significant sources of water. This most basic necessity was brought in by transport by both belligerents while the only major source of water was a major strategic objective for both sides. The Bolivian Army was based on modern European ideas of combined arms, with limitations allowed for budget. Bolivia and Paraguay were the two poorest states in the region and while both suffered logistical issues, Bolivia’s more modern Army suffered far worse from the poor logistical situation. The lack of trucks meant that the commanders in the Gran Chaco had a choice: keep the tanks running or get water to the troops. Issues with water were to prove a major disability with Bolivian forces with thousands of troops surrendering due to dehydration to Paraguay (Hughes 2005) (Facrcau 1996). Bolivia also faces another disadvantage with a poor road infrastructure and a geographically long distance from the battlespace. As Hughes notes in his excellent study of the logistics of the Chaco War the distance from the capital (La Paz) to the battlespace was nearly a 1000 miles with only half that covered by railroad. The remainder was composed of broken and narrow roads through impossibly rugged terrain (Hughes 2005, p. 426). Paraguay, in contrast, suffered many of the same issues but with a smaller army and less technology transport was somewhat eased. In addition Paraguay had the added advantage of a Navy on the river Paraguay that provided yeomen service in the supply of the field army. 

China suffered many identical issues in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. One author describes Chinese logistical capability as being a serious problem (Chen 1983). The ratio of trucks to troops was low even with Chinese emphasis on waging a “low-tech” conflict. With little air transport and facing rugged terrain that split their forces into ever smaller sub-units, the Chinese were forced to rely on requisitioned trucks, livestock (donkeys) and hired laborers to maintain their supply lines. This concept of logistics followed the Chinese theory of “manpower over weapons” that stemmed from Mao’s concept of a “People’s War”.  While modernization was certainly pushed in China prior to the conflict the Army remained in 1979 a “People’s Army” and possessed a logistical capability that reflected this period of development (Chen 1983). The Vietnamese view of Chinese logistics was part of Hanoi’s assertion that China was “incapable of a large scale, protracted war of aggression” (Porter 1984). 

Supplying troops with munitions and rations is often difficult for small and less developed states. This difficulty is compounded when operating modern military equipment, especially an air force. After overcoming the hurdle in obtaining modern arms and equipment, states will need to repair and maintain it. Iran after the 1979 revolution and Ethiopia in the Ogaden War both suffered when their supply of munitions and parts ran low for their American built machines (Cordesman 1991) (Tareke 2000). The Somalis suffered the same fate for their Soviet built arsenal after expelling Soviet advisors and severing all ties to the second world in November of 1977 (Tareke 2000). The Somalis had gambled on receiving American assistance to fill the void but this did not occur until after the end of hostilities. Until March of 1978 Somali was at a major disadvantage while Ethiopia received not only massive amounts of Soviet arms and assistance but also nearly 18,000 Cuban troops from Cuba and from the Cuban mission in Angola (Tareke 2000). 

Four major issues plague small states in regards to logistics. 

-First is limited or underdeveloped infrastructure. Without the ability to transport supplies into the battle space even well stocked quartermasters can render a defeat. 

-Second is the transport itself. While trucks can be overlooked for additional tank, the truck is more important in many ways, as Bolivia found out in the Chaco War with the stark choice to transport water or fuel. Air transport is generally regarded as something only a major power with a substantial budget can undertake, no matter a small state with extremely limited resources. 

- Third is sustainment. This is a combination of the state’s ability to supply its forces beyond the initial period of war and long term options for supply and munitions of units in the battlespace. In many small conflicts both belligerents experience this. Iran’s logistical system in the wake of the revolution was absolutely chaotic and actually supplying the troops on the frontlines proved difficult due to the inability to locate stocks of parts, equipment, and munitions (Cordesman 1991). 

-Fourth and finally is a state’s ability to service and maintain modern machines of war. The Chaco War first demonstrated the need for competent foreign technical assistant with issues surrounding Bolivia’s representatives from their major arms supplier, Vickers.  Hughes describes one of the few Vickers representatives in Bolivia as unable to speak Spanish and, quoting the British Legation, “totally out of his depth” (Hughes 2005). Complex weapons demand training and assistance, something not always available to small states in a world of shifting international politics and preferences. 

Logistics is an art form; the ability to deliver men and material to the battlespace is an essential attribute in any conflict, no matter how limited. Often small states are forced to choose between logistics and weapons systems. The outcome of this choice will very often dictate the course of a conflict.

The Failure of Soviet Advisors in Afghanistan

The Soviet effort in Afghanistan is an example of how a potentially successful advisory effort failed because of the identity of the assisting country.  The Soviets installed advisors at in the Afghani General Staff down to the battalion level.[1] At the lowest levels many Soviet advisors faced cultural and language issues: similar problems that plague advisory missions throughout history. However many Soviet advisors were aghast at the inability of their host unit to undertake specific missions leading to the advisors assuming direct command of their Afghan Army unit. In addition Soviet advisors often uncritically took the advice of their advisees. These attributes, and some others, added up to a near paralysis in the Afghani army and an over reliance on the Soviet advisor contingent.[2]

 

The Soviet failure with the Afghani Army was also rooted in the unwillingness of many Afghan troops to absorb the norms being taught. One captured rebel fighter said of the better trained and Soviet advised troops that their “tactics were to shoot indiscriminately than flee”. [3] The Army’s poor state of equipment, weapons, hygiene and rations represented an immediate need that many Soviet Advisors, as above, attended to personally. Organizationally the embedded Soviet advisors were entirely separate from the operations of 40^th Army in country and lacked a coordinating chain of command for different advisors in separate units. In the large Afghan units it was not uncommon to see Soviet Advisors take over meetings and planning sessions while their advisees stood behind them, often the Soviet would argue amongst themselves as well. One primary reason for this hijacking of command by the nominal unit advisor was the Soviet model of accountability. If an Afghan unit failed it was often the advisor that took the brunt of blame and with it possible loss of rank and privileges. Like many other facets of Soviet society many advisors sought to perverse their own reputation in order to transfer back to the regular forces rather than risk punishment for actions that were essentially out of their hands.[4]

 

The Soviets had some success with Afghan Special Forces, namely the KhAD (secret police) and the creation of a gendarme.[5] The creation of these forces also played on the strength the Soviets possessed in the creation and training of specialized groups of troops to undertake special missions. The KhAD and Afghan police also benefited from increased Soviet provided training, equipment and weapons.  Despite the success of Afghan Special Forces little thought was given to the primary COIN mission of the Afghan Army. The development and maintenance of a militia that functioned outside the nominal chain of command was only partially a success due to infiltration by mujahedin and lack of essential tools, such as weapons and training. Militias were a Soviet political project and, once more, separate from the military advisors attached to the Afghan Army. 

Soviet advisory efforts failed after the withdrawal of the 40^th Army. Afghani efforts against the mujahedin relied on Soviet fire and air support which went away after the withdrawal. The ready availability of equipment led to an exceedingly poor maintenance record in Afghan units and fuel was a widespread problem throughout the war. [6] The Afghanis were generally unwilling to perform independent operations and this led to a failure in the transfer of control for many regions in the country. Once Soviet money dried up once and for all in 1992 the days of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were numbered. 

The Soviet effort highlights how advisory missions, even well supported ones, fail. By applying norms from the Soviet experience to the Afghans the Soviets failed to take into account local issues of recruitment, training and culture. This led to exceedingly high desertions rates in DRA units that were often riddled with tribal loyalties. These loyalties would conflict with the war in general: many troops were conscripted and more than willing to desert to a familiar tribe, even if that tribe was part of the mujahedin. The conflicting chain of command between 40^th Army and the Soviet advisory effort made coordination difficult.  Soviet combined arms tactics require coordination at the lowest levels but exercising these in Afghanistan was made more difficult by the relatively high placement of Soviet Advisors (battalion level) and the separate command structures. The level of Soviet control proved another factor in the failure of the Afghanis after 1988. As noted previously the Soviet preferred to directly command their units rather than risk failure from an advisory role. This notion encouraged Afghan units to not conduct independent operations without Soviet combat units supporting them. This extended to the Afghani Air Force as well: the poor training and conditions of pilots led to an over-reliance of Soviet air assets. Soviet advisors fought the war as though they were in control, rather than preparing their advisees to operate independently. This extended to how they fought the war and the failure of Soviet tactics rather than the adaptation of local methods to fight the mujahedin

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[1] Kalinovsky, Artemy. The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, COIN and Nation-building in Afghanistan. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #60, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

[2] Kalinovsky, p. 20

[3] Oliker, Olga. Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010. P. 15

[4] Oliker, p. 47

[5] Oliker, p. 30-35.

[6] Oliker, p. 52