There will be some consequences and possible actions that
everybody has available to them.
The Russians:
-Long Term Economic Consequences: Early March is seeing the
ruble take a nosedive on the world markets. Investors are dumping their rubles
and, as the market does, many follow. If the Ukraine wanted to really play
along, dumping their rubles would hurt the Russians in the place it will
ultimately hurt most: the pocket book. In addition many Russians are buying
dollars, further increasing the disparity.
-The cost, as of March 3rd, for the Russian
attack is running at 10 billion. It costs some serious money to mount a full
scale land, sea and air attack on even a neighboring country. How long can
Russia sustain this expense?
-Why? Putin doesn’t want a NATO or EU ally on his western
border. The Crimean Emergency follows the general pattern of the 2008 South Ossetia
war except for one important aspect; Ukraine did not take the first shot.
Georgia was both an expectant member of NATO and a close ally of the west.
Russia likes its buffer states, a lot. It’s also losing them at a fairly fast
rate, which historically has never been good for Russian security.
-Opportunity: Ukrainian domestic strife was Putin’s green
light to accomplish something he had put on the radar years ago. Encouragement
of pro-Russian activity certainly had been going on before the official movement
of the military began. Ukraine’s cultural, ethnic and linguistic situation
places it between the west and the east and made the step of taking over the
very Russian Crimea easy. What counts is how the Ukrainian military handles it.
-What Putin can do to solidify his hold: The smart bet would
be to call for a vote from the residents of the Crimea. Certainly this will go
in favor of Russia, judging from the initial reaction by residents of the
Crimea. It would give Putin political leverage and make Ukraine’s position less
sound.
At 9EST the Russian ultimatum for Ukrainian forces to
abandon their posts in the Crimea is set to expire. What happens next will
determine the character of this emergency.
Ukraine:
-Ukrainian Capability: As of 3/3 the Ukrainian military is
mobilizing its reserves. It’s not a large force, and certainly smaller than the
RFR military. But it’s also concentrated in a far, far smaller area and Russia
has other security concerns that, in all likelihood, put the military
capability at near parity. The Ukrainian military is not as advanced but they
would also put up a fight if Putin decided to mount a larger attack. The
disparity in technology will have less effect on the defenders than the
attackers.
-Play it Cool: So far the Ukrainian reaction has been
political, not military. They need to let the Russians act first. This will get
them more political capital in whatever road they pursue. The status of the
Crimea and its semi-autonomous status quite possibly play a part in this; it
was easier to let go, at least in the short term.
-Partition: Realistically Ukraine could just partition itself
out, the east going to Russia and the West going with the EU. Practically, this
won’t happen unless the state calls for a vote. Ukrainian nationalism is a very
real thing and the eastern half of the country isn’t as pro-Russian as the
Crimea. The last time a nation tried to remove itself from the state was
Croatia and the resulting Yugoslav Civil War was devastating. Several pundits have discussed this option but
unless a popular vote overwhelmingly demands it, it most likely is a
non-option.
-Use Force: Not a good option. Offensive action would quite possibly
stretch the Ukrainians past their breaking point as well as dilute the,
hopefully, forthcoming aid packages from the west. The Ukrainian military has
been under a series of reforms since 2013 and this has reduced their total
numbers by around 40,000 as well as made the military an all-volunteer force.
This was done as a cost saving measure.
The West and the rest:
-NATO: The best course of action is no action beyond
political and economic support. If Putin would go further, and I believe he won’t,
some could compare this to NATO’s inaction in 1956 during the Hungarian
Uprising. But in the age of globalization and interdependence, using NATO’s
economic power to sanction Russia would be a far better course of action. NATO
traditionally wants to not escalate a situation in Europe. Any direct military
intervention here would be just that.
-European Union: Again, a political and economic response would be more devastating to
Russia than any military action.
-As of 3/3 Poland was conducting a limited mobilization
towards its eastern border. This is more likely done in response to a potential
refugee issue than any Russian threat. Neither Romania nor Hungary has overtly
moved more troops but this could and probably will change if refugee issues
threaten to become a problem.
-The US quite probably made a mistake with the language it
used on 2/28 and 3/1. The ability to deliver severe consequences will be necessarily
very limited. In a military sense Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, located about
25 miles northwest of the Black Sea city of Constanta and about 2,500 miles
northwest of Afghanistan could serve as a potential asset, depending of course
on how the Romanians view the situation. But military force is not the answer
here. Economic sanctions and political maneuvering is a far better alternative.
The Obama doctrine which is to plan, execute, follow but not lead, should once
more take precedence here. Let the EU/NATO make the move with US support on the
back end.
-The Snowden addendum: I wonder if the issues with US
intelligence and the flat footed response are because of the loss of
intelligence assets on the ground in Russia due to the Snowden leaks. Snowden compromised
far more than simply the NSA spying. He also, most likely, compromised US
intelligence world-wide and then fled to one of the more repressive regimes in
the region. It’s not a stretch of the imagination that the RFR could have used
intelligence provided by Snowden to fix leaks and compromised intelligence. Just a thought and I have seen absolutely
nothing to back it up.
The Crimean Emergency is power politics in an era of interdependence
where aggression by a large power will not pay the same dividends it did a
century ago. Russia, and by default Putin, may have taken one step too far.
While further military action with western states is very unlikely, economic repercussions
are. Russia’s economy is not the strongest to begin with and the cost of
military action, the cost of supplying the Crimea (which obtains most of its
goods and services from Ukraine via land routes) and already occurring devaluation
of the ruble the further, long term consequences could be devastating.
But the already strengthening national spirit
in Russia will most likely give Putin a free hand to pursue whatever policy he’s
willing to risk in the coming days, weeks and months.I'll try to update in the coming days and see how wrong I am.
