The Failure of Soviet Advisors in Afghanistan

The Soviet effort in Afghanistan is an example of how a potentially successful advisory effort failed because of the identity of the assisting country.  The Soviets installed advisors at in the Afghani General Staff down to the battalion level.[1] At the lowest levels many Soviet advisors faced cultural and language issues: similar problems that plague advisory missions throughout history. However many Soviet advisors were aghast at the inability of their host unit to undertake specific missions leading to the advisors assuming direct command of their Afghan Army unit. In addition Soviet advisors often uncritically took the advice of their advisees. These attributes, and some others, added up to a near paralysis in the Afghani army and an over reliance on the Soviet advisor contingent.[2]

 

The Soviet failure with the Afghani Army was also rooted in the unwillingness of many Afghan troops to absorb the norms being taught. One captured rebel fighter said of the better trained and Soviet advised troops that their “tactics were to shoot indiscriminately than flee”. [3] The Army’s poor state of equipment, weapons, hygiene and rations represented an immediate need that many Soviet Advisors, as above, attended to personally. Organizationally the embedded Soviet advisors were entirely separate from the operations of 40^th Army in country and lacked a coordinating chain of command for different advisors in separate units. In the large Afghan units it was not uncommon to see Soviet Advisors take over meetings and planning sessions while their advisees stood behind them, often the Soviet would argue amongst themselves as well. One primary reason for this hijacking of command by the nominal unit advisor was the Soviet model of accountability. If an Afghan unit failed it was often the advisor that took the brunt of blame and with it possible loss of rank and privileges. Like many other facets of Soviet society many advisors sought to perverse their own reputation in order to transfer back to the regular forces rather than risk punishment for actions that were essentially out of their hands.[4]

 

The Soviets had some success with Afghan Special Forces, namely the KhAD (secret police) and the creation of a gendarme.[5] The creation of these forces also played on the strength the Soviets possessed in the creation and training of specialized groups of troops to undertake special missions. The KhAD and Afghan police also benefited from increased Soviet provided training, equipment and weapons.  Despite the success of Afghan Special Forces little thought was given to the primary COIN mission of the Afghan Army. The development and maintenance of a militia that functioned outside the nominal chain of command was only partially a success due to infiltration by mujahedin and lack of essential tools, such as weapons and training. Militias were a Soviet political project and, once more, separate from the military advisors attached to the Afghan Army. 

Soviet advisory efforts failed after the withdrawal of the 40^th Army. Afghani efforts against the mujahedin relied on Soviet fire and air support which went away after the withdrawal. The ready availability of equipment led to an exceedingly poor maintenance record in Afghan units and fuel was a widespread problem throughout the war. [6] The Afghanis were generally unwilling to perform independent operations and this led to a failure in the transfer of control for many regions in the country. Once Soviet money dried up once and for all in 1992 the days of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were numbered. 

The Soviet effort highlights how advisory missions, even well supported ones, fail. By applying norms from the Soviet experience to the Afghans the Soviets failed to take into account local issues of recruitment, training and culture. This led to exceedingly high desertions rates in DRA units that were often riddled with tribal loyalties. These loyalties would conflict with the war in general: many troops were conscripted and more than willing to desert to a familiar tribe, even if that tribe was part of the mujahedin. The conflicting chain of command between 40^th Army and the Soviet advisory effort made coordination difficult.  Soviet combined arms tactics require coordination at the lowest levels but exercising these in Afghanistan was made more difficult by the relatively high placement of Soviet Advisors (battalion level) and the separate command structures. The level of Soviet control proved another factor in the failure of the Afghanis after 1988. As noted previously the Soviet preferred to directly command their units rather than risk failure from an advisory role. This notion encouraged Afghan units to not conduct independent operations without Soviet combat units supporting them. This extended to the Afghani Air Force as well: the poor training and conditions of pilots led to an over-reliance of Soviet air assets. Soviet advisors fought the war as though they were in control, rather than preparing their advisees to operate independently. This extended to how they fought the war and the failure of Soviet tactics rather than the adaptation of local methods to fight the mujahedin

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[1] Kalinovsky, Artemy. The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, COIN and Nation-building in Afghanistan. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #60, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

[2] Kalinovsky, p. 20

[3] Oliker, Olga. Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010. P. 15

[4] Oliker, p. 47

[5] Oliker, p. 30-35.

[6] Oliker, p. 52