Thursday, March 6, 2014

Post Crimea Space Cooperation: Finding a new ride.



US/Russian space cooperation has been an important part of space politics since 1996 and the placement of American Astronauts on Mir. Russian support has been essential to the International Space Station with the expense of the shuttle program (and after the Columbia disaster in 2003). Since the retirement of the shuttle program Russian support has been essential. The American space program is currently experiencing an odd “in-between” period with the continued development of a new launch system and the still-baby steps of private space contractors. The factor covering these is the dependable Souyz launch system and Russian cooperation. This looks to be in jeopardy with tensions over the Crimea. This, of course, raises a few different issues involving how Americans are going to get into orbit. Private contractors have proven they are able to launch supply flights into low-orbit. NASA is still developing the Orion launch system and the first unmanned flight is planned for September, 2014. I see a few options and none of them are cheap:

-Accelerate the development of Orion: This would require giving NASA more money, and with Congress unable to agree on anything these days I don’t see this happening. 

-Accelerate the development of private space venture: The existing space companies, like Space X, have launch systems that can support manned flight. The Space X system, named Dragon, is planning its first manned flight in 2015. 

-Kiss and make up to the Russians, or at least separate space from foreign policy: The shakiest option, especially as tensions continue to rise. Hitching a ride with the Russians after the rhetoric that has been exchanged over Crimea would be awkward to say the least. Very, very awkward. Sort of like calling your ex for a ride from a bar after a really, really, really bad break-up.

-Find somebody else: Of other space programs, only China currently has a manned flight capability and not only are they strategic partners to the Russians but questions arise to the capability to replace the Russians. From what I’ve read, probably not, even if a partnership could be formed, which most likely will not happen anyway.

The US has two options, deal with foreign policy and space or pump cash into NASA and private space companies. On the other side, the loss of American money from the Russian space program could seriously hurt it as well. The American infusion of cash has played a significant part in keeping the Russians above water; the loss of this money could very well see the Russian program scaled back significantly. Cooperation in space is not just sound policy but budgetary as well. Program cuts have seen both sides rely upon the other.  Essentially, cutting the space cooperation will hurt both states but in the right circumstances this could be a shot in the arm for the American public and private space programs

Monday, March 3, 2014

2014 Crimean Emergency


There will be some consequences and possible actions that everybody has available to them.
The Russians:

-Long Term Economic Consequences: Early March is seeing the ruble take a nosedive on the world markets. Investors are dumping their rubles and, as the market does, many follow. If the Ukraine wanted to really play along, dumping their rubles would hurt the Russians in the place it will ultimately hurt most: the pocket book. In addition many Russians are buying dollars, further increasing the disparity. 

-The cost, as of March 3rd, for the Russian attack is running at 10 billion. It costs some serious money to mount a full scale land, sea and air attack on even a neighboring country. How long can Russia sustain this expense?

-Why? Putin doesn’t want a NATO or EU ally on his western border. The Crimean Emergency follows the general pattern of the 2008 South Ossetia war except for one important aspect; Ukraine did not take the first shot. Georgia was both an expectant member of NATO and a close ally of the west. Russia likes its buffer states, a lot. It’s also losing them at a fairly fast rate, which historically has never been good for Russian security. 

-Opportunity: Ukrainian domestic strife was Putin’s green light to accomplish something he had put on the radar years ago. Encouragement of pro-Russian activity certainly had been going on before the official movement of the military began. Ukraine’s cultural, ethnic and linguistic situation places it between the west and the east and made the step of taking over the very Russian Crimea easy. What counts is how the Ukrainian military handles it. 

-What Putin can do to solidify his hold: The smart bet would be to call for a vote from the residents of the Crimea. Certainly this will go in favor of Russia, judging from the initial reaction by residents of the Crimea. It would give Putin political leverage and make Ukraine’s position less sound.
At 9EST the Russian ultimatum for Ukrainian forces to abandon their posts in the Crimea is set to expire. What happens next will determine the character of this emergency. 

Ukraine: 

-Ukrainian Capability: As of 3/3 the Ukrainian military is mobilizing its reserves. It’s not a large force, and certainly smaller than the RFR military. But it’s also concentrated in a far, far smaller area and Russia has other security concerns that, in all likelihood, put the military capability at near parity. The Ukrainian military is not as advanced but they would also put up a fight if Putin decided to mount a larger attack. The disparity in technology will have less effect on the defenders than the attackers. 

-Play it Cool: So far the Ukrainian reaction has been political, not military. They need to let the Russians act first. This will get them more political capital in whatever road they pursue. The status of the Crimea and its semi-autonomous status quite possibly play a part in this; it was easier to let go, at least in the short term. 

-Partition: Realistically Ukraine could just partition itself out, the east going to Russia and the West going with the EU. Practically, this won’t happen unless the state calls for a vote. Ukrainian nationalism is a very real thing and the eastern half of the country isn’t as pro-Russian as the Crimea. The last time a nation tried to remove itself from the state was Croatia and the resulting Yugoslav Civil War was devastating.  Several pundits have discussed this option but unless a popular vote overwhelmingly demands it, it most likely is a non-option. 

-Use Force: Not a good option. Offensive action would quite possibly stretch the Ukrainians past their breaking point as well as dilute the, hopefully, forthcoming aid packages from the west. The Ukrainian military has been under a series of reforms since 2013 and this has reduced their total numbers by around 40,000 as well as made the military an all-volunteer force. This was done as a cost saving measure.

The West and the rest:

-NATO: The best course of action is no action beyond political and economic support. If Putin would go further, and I believe he won’t, some could compare this to NATO’s inaction in 1956 during the Hungarian Uprising. But in the age of globalization and interdependence, using NATO’s economic power to sanction Russia would be a far better course of action. NATO traditionally wants to not escalate a situation in Europe. Any direct military intervention here would be just that. 

-European Union: Again, a political and  economic response would be more devastating to Russia than any military action. 

-As of 3/3 Poland was conducting a limited mobilization towards its eastern border. This is more likely done in response to a potential refugee issue than any Russian threat. Neither Romania nor Hungary has overtly moved more troops but this could and probably will change if refugee issues threaten to become a problem. 

-The US quite probably made a mistake with the language it used on 2/28 and 3/1. The ability to deliver severe consequences will be necessarily very limited. In a military sense Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, located about 25 miles northwest of the Black Sea city of Constanta and about 2,500 miles northwest of Afghanistan could serve as a potential asset, depending of course on how the Romanians view the situation. But military force is not the answer here. Economic sanctions and political maneuvering is a far better alternative. The Obama doctrine which is to plan, execute, follow but not lead, should once more take precedence here. Let the EU/NATO make the move with US support on the back end. 

-The Snowden addendum: I wonder if the issues with US intelligence and the flat footed response are because of the loss of intelligence assets on the ground in Russia due to the Snowden leaks. Snowden compromised far more than simply the NSA spying. He also, most likely, compromised US intelligence world-wide and then fled to one of the more repressive regimes in the region. It’s not a stretch of the imagination that the RFR could have used intelligence provided by Snowden to fix leaks and compromised intelligence.  Just a thought and I have seen absolutely nothing to back it up.     
The Crimean Emergency is power politics in an era of interdependence where aggression by a large power will not pay the same dividends it did a century ago. Russia, and by default Putin, may have taken one step too far. While further military action with western states is very unlikely, economic repercussions are. Russia’s economy is not the strongest to begin with and the cost of military action, the cost of supplying the Crimea (which obtains most of its goods and services from Ukraine via land routes) and already occurring devaluation of the ruble the further, long term consequences could be devastating.  But the already strengthening national spirit in Russia will most likely give Putin a free hand to pursue whatever policy he’s willing to risk in the coming days, weeks and months.I'll try to update in the coming days and see how wrong I am.

Tuesday, February 4, 2014

The F-35: Gucci in a Filson World



The F-35 has been a source of controversy for a few years now. A fifth generation multi-role fighter developed to replace aging (and not so aging in the case of the F-22) airframes across the DoD, the F-35 seemingly falls into the trap of trying to please everybody and thus pleasing nobody. A recent article in Defense News (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140204/DEFREG03/302040018?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter) discusses the F-35 and Japan. Japan has been on the verge for a while of officially re-acquiring its armed forces and upping its capability in the face of a perceived Chinese threat. In a recent interview the PM, Abe, noted that the relationship between China and Japan mirrors that of the UK and Germany on the eve of the First World War, an interesting statement as the centennial dawns. Originally I saw signs that the Japanese intended to make the F-35 a cornerstone of a new stance on security. This stance would assume more of a partnership role with the US without actually displacing it in the East Asian power structure. The SDF likes, loves actually, next generation western weapons systems; the F-35 is just one example. 

The point here is that if the JSF is going so far over-budget for the SDF that they are starting to have second thoughts while cutting their order, what does this mean for the US? The Marines already have one operational squadron with the special VTOL capability. Delivery is starting to commence with the Navy and Air Force. And questions already exist about the ability of the F-35 to improve upon existing Super Hornet and Raptor airframes. One engine vs. two, shorter range and smaller payload; that’s just the beginning of the capability issues many have raised against the JSF. Canada is also having second thoughts and with a renewed emphasis on Arctic security those basic capability issues may limit the ability of the RCAF to design effective mission profiles for their northern territory. 

I saw the JSF acquisition as a symbol of Japanese resurgence in the East Asian power structure. But is it really? It’s obviously more advanced than anything the Chinese possess. Perhaps that’s the problem, the dazzlingly advanced technology is not enough to offset the cost and the fact that the SDF could operate with something like the Eurofighter or the Gripen. But the alliance with the US pretty much ensures that that will not happen, barring some unforeseen circumstance. The F-35, for all its issues, is going to come. I only wonder what is on the drawing board to replace it.

Wednesday, January 22, 2014



Ernest King’s Reading List

I’m a very big fan of the Ernest King. “Uncle Ernie” as he was known when he commanded Lexington in the ‘30s, was a sonofabitch. Even his grandson called him that. He never said the famous quote “when they get into trouble they call the SOBs” but his Chief of Staff, McRea, did. There’s little doubt that he was a fighting sonofabitch. He shaped the Navy’s two ocean war and played shepherd to post-war American maritime power. He was a champion of naval airpower from his days commanding aircraft carriers. He built more ships than he had personnel for. He fought tooth and nail to keep the Navy out from the overall command of MacArthur and under the auspices of Nimitz. He was an authentic SOB who wrinkled many egos including the British. He was quick to anger and prone to a streak of assholishness. King was also quick to recognize subordinates who could do the job and was content to let them do it without interference, hence Nimitz.  He was a man of many different faces and subtleties. It’s a crime that there is no super carrier named after him, he laid the ground work for the modern US Navy after all.
This post though is not really about Uncle Ernie. It’s about his reading list, if he had one. Today professional reading lists are a staple for NCO and officer development in the US military. Not so much in the 30s and 40s. What I decided to do is mix classic and modern works together to try to represent what he would have released, had there not been a world war on. King knew the US was at the cusp of hegemony and with a free hand built a Navy the likes of which the world will never see again. What would he recommend to read?

Influence of Sea Power upon History by Alfred Thayer Mahan.
        Of course this needs to be on any list worth its salt. Mahan uses history to prove his case that Seapower is essential to building and maintaining an empire. King would have most likely read this and digested it. His vision of the US Navy certainly does a good job of proving what Mahan was talking about. 

The First World War: Volume 1: To Arms by Hew Strachan.
        If you need historical confirmation of why Seapower is important, look no further. The first volume of this wonderfully massive work confirms the fact that if you don’t have a navy or willing to use the navy you can kiss your territories bye. The German colonies were essentially cut off from the Fatherland the minute war was declared. While the land campaign in Africa varied in its effectiveness the Royal Navy’s control of the oceans voided any German attempts to supply or reinforce their colonies.  Strachan is an excellent historian and this project three volume work has already been distilled into a condensed book. 

Lee’s Lieutenants
        King actually did own this book, based on a conversation with one of his grandchildren. Lee’s Lieutenants chronicles the top generals in the Confederate Army and how they fought the civil war. It still holds relevance as a survey of how the strategic war was fought by the Confederacy. Some authors have put out some pretty decent work on how the concept of gallant officers would alone save the Confederacy. Lee’s Lieutenants does reinforce that belief and paints a picture of a mixed bag of officers who could pull off victories but fail at intelligence and logistics. 

Street without Joy by Bernard Fall
        While the French ended Indo-China nearly five years after King’s death, I can easily imagine this book on his list. Fall was invested in Indo-China in a way that so many authors were not. In addition he’s actually a good writer, somebody who lets his cynicism shine through about the French effort. With the recent issues in Afghanistan and Iraq Street Without Joy needs to be read and re-read by everybody thinking about modern insurgencies and how to fight them. Ideology may have been replaced by religion but the methods are often then same. 

The Gettysburg Campaign by Edwin Coddington  
Coddington’s book is a classic strategic level analysis of the entire campaign surrounding the epic three day battle. I suspect King was interested in the Civil War and would have appreciated the grand strategic view Coddington offers. 

The Sea Heritage: A Study in Maritime Warfare by Sir Admiral Fredric Dreyer
Slightly biased on this one. Dreyer and his brother developed the advanced, for its time, range finder system for the HMS Hood. He captained Beatty’s flagship during Jutland and in the Second War he served as the heard of the Armed Merchant Fleet. While King disliked the British he would have had to appreciate their grasp of naval strategy, however flawed it was at times. Dreyer offers a neat view of how Jutland developed from the perspective of someone who was there.

      Stalin’s Keys to Victory: The Rebrith of the Red Army in WWII by Walter Dunn
King would have appreciated this book, methinks. As he was instrumental in building the US Navy he quite possibly would have interested in seeing how Stalin forged a new Red Army from the remains of the old. The rise of US Naval power and the Cold War Navy was largely founded on King’s desire to mold a force powerful enough to take on two seas at once. At one point there were more ships than men, a situation that must have pleased King.

Zulu Rising by Ian Knight
The Zulu War is a conflict in the mold of classical British colonial wars. The planning and strategy were all flawed and this resulted in the single greatest disaster to befall a colonial Army, Isandlwana. Knight is one of the top historians on the war and this book is a culmination of decades of research. King would have liked it quite possibly as a warning to the hubris that can get an operation in trouble. He was cautious for the first few years of the war and rarely forgave unjustified mistakes. The Zulu War would provide a lesson in that.

A Harvest of Barren Regrets by Charles Mills
The life of Frederick Benteen is one of my favorite reads. I’m personally something of a Benteen fanboy and I’m not really sure why. He was a solid combat veteran who shined in a very dire situation at the Little Big Horn. He was popular but made enough enemies up the ranks that he was eventually drummed up on false charges during his tenure at Fort “Dushame” in Utah. I do not know if King would have shown the same interest as me but his personal situation somewhat mirrors that of Benteen. At the start of the war King was scheduled to be sidelined and retired but FDR appointed him to Command the fleet instead. Hell of a switch and proves that in dire need, the sonsofbitches will save the day. 

Afghansty by Rodric Braithwaite
Braithewaite’s new book on the Soviets in Afghanistan is not just readable but an outstanding contribution to the rather miniscule amount of literature in English detailing the Soviet war. It provided an excellent parallel with the on-going NATO effort to defeat an insurgency and establish something like a stable government. King, I suspect, would have read it and teased out the lessons the Soviets learned. 

The Rhodesian War by Paul Moorecraft
The decade long Rhodesian war can serve as a lesson of what to and what not to do. The military operations were extremely effective, competently led and fought. The ability to supply these operations with an embargo going on is also impressive. The domestic issues, like a lack of strategy and ineffective coordination between separate forces, proved too big a problem to overcome. King would have seen this as a lesson to be applied to future operations, I would bet. 

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul Dull
I’m positive King would have liked to have this book in early 1942. Dull’s book is a great breakdown of how the IJN achieved its successes ad what led to its ultimate fall and final defeat. The final two years of war are marked by incredibly wasteful notions of honor that led to the sacrifice of thousands of Japanese sailors in actions that were marked by the inability to engage US forces in anything resembling a fair fight. The death of the Yamato in particular would strike any naval strategist as a waste of men and material for no reason besides a vague notion of sacrifice and honor. King would approve of this book as it aptly demonstrates the impact his fleet had on destroying the IJN as a battle worthy force. 

A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens by Lawrence Babits
Combining military history and analysis, this book is a refreshing approach to a battle that can be rather neglected at times. Cowpens was a unique engagement, clearly out of the box as far as tactics go. The resounding defeat of the British went a long way to establishing an American presence in the southern theater. I think King would have appreciated the creative application of the militia and the use of the regulars as a backbone to ultimately stiffen the line. Fascinating battle, great book. 

The Last Place on Earth by Roland Huntford
I can see this on King’s reading list. The dichotomy of two explorers, one prepared for nearly every contingency and finding a better way to do things no matter what versus a man who prepared only minimally and refused to change. One was extraordinarily successful and the other perished on the return trip. Amundsen’s polar journey was extraordinary not for the ease which he made the pole but for the logistics and preparation behind it. I can see this lesson applying to many operations during the war. Amundsen made polar travel look almost easy and the ability to do that is couched in a language of self-education and self-criticism. Scott, in contrast, failed because he choose a path that made his trip difficult by design. The British ability to “muddle through” should certainly be celebrated at times but not here. Scott’s choice to muddle through killed him and his party.

OK, I have lots more to post but those will come later. Several folks have handed me great suggestions which I'll end up incorporating in here as well.  I figure that this is enough to begin occupying King’s resurrected bookshelf.