Wednesday, January 22, 2014



Ernest King’s Reading List

I’m a very big fan of the Ernest King. “Uncle Ernie” as he was known when he commanded Lexington in the ‘30s, was a sonofabitch. Even his grandson called him that. He never said the famous quote “when they get into trouble they call the SOBs” but his Chief of Staff, McRea, did. There’s little doubt that he was a fighting sonofabitch. He shaped the Navy’s two ocean war and played shepherd to post-war American maritime power. He was a champion of naval airpower from his days commanding aircraft carriers. He built more ships than he had personnel for. He fought tooth and nail to keep the Navy out from the overall command of MacArthur and under the auspices of Nimitz. He was an authentic SOB who wrinkled many egos including the British. He was quick to anger and prone to a streak of assholishness. King was also quick to recognize subordinates who could do the job and was content to let them do it without interference, hence Nimitz.  He was a man of many different faces and subtleties. It’s a crime that there is no super carrier named after him, he laid the ground work for the modern US Navy after all.
This post though is not really about Uncle Ernie. It’s about his reading list, if he had one. Today professional reading lists are a staple for NCO and officer development in the US military. Not so much in the 30s and 40s. What I decided to do is mix classic and modern works together to try to represent what he would have released, had there not been a world war on. King knew the US was at the cusp of hegemony and with a free hand built a Navy the likes of which the world will never see again. What would he recommend to read?

Influence of Sea Power upon History by Alfred Thayer Mahan.
        Of course this needs to be on any list worth its salt. Mahan uses history to prove his case that Seapower is essential to building and maintaining an empire. King would have most likely read this and digested it. His vision of the US Navy certainly does a good job of proving what Mahan was talking about. 

The First World War: Volume 1: To Arms by Hew Strachan.
        If you need historical confirmation of why Seapower is important, look no further. The first volume of this wonderfully massive work confirms the fact that if you don’t have a navy or willing to use the navy you can kiss your territories bye. The German colonies were essentially cut off from the Fatherland the minute war was declared. While the land campaign in Africa varied in its effectiveness the Royal Navy’s control of the oceans voided any German attempts to supply or reinforce their colonies.  Strachan is an excellent historian and this project three volume work has already been distilled into a condensed book. 

Lee’s Lieutenants
        King actually did own this book, based on a conversation with one of his grandchildren. Lee’s Lieutenants chronicles the top generals in the Confederate Army and how they fought the civil war. It still holds relevance as a survey of how the strategic war was fought by the Confederacy. Some authors have put out some pretty decent work on how the concept of gallant officers would alone save the Confederacy. Lee’s Lieutenants does reinforce that belief and paints a picture of a mixed bag of officers who could pull off victories but fail at intelligence and logistics. 

Street without Joy by Bernard Fall
        While the French ended Indo-China nearly five years after King’s death, I can easily imagine this book on his list. Fall was invested in Indo-China in a way that so many authors were not. In addition he’s actually a good writer, somebody who lets his cynicism shine through about the French effort. With the recent issues in Afghanistan and Iraq Street Without Joy needs to be read and re-read by everybody thinking about modern insurgencies and how to fight them. Ideology may have been replaced by religion but the methods are often then same. 

The Gettysburg Campaign by Edwin Coddington  
Coddington’s book is a classic strategic level analysis of the entire campaign surrounding the epic three day battle. I suspect King was interested in the Civil War and would have appreciated the grand strategic view Coddington offers. 

The Sea Heritage: A Study in Maritime Warfare by Sir Admiral Fredric Dreyer
Slightly biased on this one. Dreyer and his brother developed the advanced, for its time, range finder system for the HMS Hood. He captained Beatty’s flagship during Jutland and in the Second War he served as the heard of the Armed Merchant Fleet. While King disliked the British he would have had to appreciate their grasp of naval strategy, however flawed it was at times. Dreyer offers a neat view of how Jutland developed from the perspective of someone who was there.

      Stalin’s Keys to Victory: The Rebrith of the Red Army in WWII by Walter Dunn
King would have appreciated this book, methinks. As he was instrumental in building the US Navy he quite possibly would have interested in seeing how Stalin forged a new Red Army from the remains of the old. The rise of US Naval power and the Cold War Navy was largely founded on King’s desire to mold a force powerful enough to take on two seas at once. At one point there were more ships than men, a situation that must have pleased King.

Zulu Rising by Ian Knight
The Zulu War is a conflict in the mold of classical British colonial wars. The planning and strategy were all flawed and this resulted in the single greatest disaster to befall a colonial Army, Isandlwana. Knight is one of the top historians on the war and this book is a culmination of decades of research. King would have liked it quite possibly as a warning to the hubris that can get an operation in trouble. He was cautious for the first few years of the war and rarely forgave unjustified mistakes. The Zulu War would provide a lesson in that.

A Harvest of Barren Regrets by Charles Mills
The life of Frederick Benteen is one of my favorite reads. I’m personally something of a Benteen fanboy and I’m not really sure why. He was a solid combat veteran who shined in a very dire situation at the Little Big Horn. He was popular but made enough enemies up the ranks that he was eventually drummed up on false charges during his tenure at Fort “Dushame” in Utah. I do not know if King would have shown the same interest as me but his personal situation somewhat mirrors that of Benteen. At the start of the war King was scheduled to be sidelined and retired but FDR appointed him to Command the fleet instead. Hell of a switch and proves that in dire need, the sonsofbitches will save the day. 

Afghansty by Rodric Braithwaite
Braithewaite’s new book on the Soviets in Afghanistan is not just readable but an outstanding contribution to the rather miniscule amount of literature in English detailing the Soviet war. It provided an excellent parallel with the on-going NATO effort to defeat an insurgency and establish something like a stable government. King, I suspect, would have read it and teased out the lessons the Soviets learned. 

The Rhodesian War by Paul Moorecraft
The decade long Rhodesian war can serve as a lesson of what to and what not to do. The military operations were extremely effective, competently led and fought. The ability to supply these operations with an embargo going on is also impressive. The domestic issues, like a lack of strategy and ineffective coordination between separate forces, proved too big a problem to overcome. King would have seen this as a lesson to be applied to future operations, I would bet. 

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul Dull
I’m positive King would have liked to have this book in early 1942. Dull’s book is a great breakdown of how the IJN achieved its successes ad what led to its ultimate fall and final defeat. The final two years of war are marked by incredibly wasteful notions of honor that led to the sacrifice of thousands of Japanese sailors in actions that were marked by the inability to engage US forces in anything resembling a fair fight. The death of the Yamato in particular would strike any naval strategist as a waste of men and material for no reason besides a vague notion of sacrifice and honor. King would approve of this book as it aptly demonstrates the impact his fleet had on destroying the IJN as a battle worthy force. 

A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens by Lawrence Babits
Combining military history and analysis, this book is a refreshing approach to a battle that can be rather neglected at times. Cowpens was a unique engagement, clearly out of the box as far as tactics go. The resounding defeat of the British went a long way to establishing an American presence in the southern theater. I think King would have appreciated the creative application of the militia and the use of the regulars as a backbone to ultimately stiffen the line. Fascinating battle, great book. 

The Last Place on Earth by Roland Huntford
I can see this on King’s reading list. The dichotomy of two explorers, one prepared for nearly every contingency and finding a better way to do things no matter what versus a man who prepared only minimally and refused to change. One was extraordinarily successful and the other perished on the return trip. Amundsen’s polar journey was extraordinary not for the ease which he made the pole but for the logistics and preparation behind it. I can see this lesson applying to many operations during the war. Amundsen made polar travel look almost easy and the ability to do that is couched in a language of self-education and self-criticism. Scott, in contrast, failed because he choose a path that made his trip difficult by design. The British ability to “muddle through” should certainly be celebrated at times but not here. Scott’s choice to muddle through killed him and his party.

OK, I have lots more to post but those will come later. Several folks have handed me great suggestions which I'll end up incorporating in here as well.  I figure that this is enough to begin occupying King’s resurrected bookshelf.  

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

T-55: The Insurgent's Friend



In Syria the FSA and some other rebel factions have acquired former Government tanks and according to Iran’s news channel Press TV (take this with a grain of salt) from Libyan arsenals supplied by the west. These mostly seem to be the venerable old T-55 which has been serving the needs of third world and smaller states for the better part of nearly 60 years. In Syria we’ve been seeing many videos of the rebels operating T-55s with varying degrees of effectiveness. Syria’s prewar armory was a mishmash of Soviet designs and anything else they could get their hands on, even ex-Wehrmacht Panzer IVs. Of course with Soviet support the T-55 and T-62 dominated the arsenal, with T-72 being delivered later on. This blog gives the figure for the T-55 as around 2250 with many in fixed static positions or, I assume, cannibalized for parts at some point. 



I’ve studied Soviet hardware since I was about five years old and the T-55 was always the hallmark of Soviet assistance. They had produced thousands upon thousands of them and throughout the 1960s the Soviet Army were more concerned with equipping themselves with the T-64 and later T-72 models. The T-55 was the bargain MBT handed out to client states. Even the Rhodesians acquired some though the South Africans intercepting a shipment meant for Uganda in the mid-1970s. The T-55 in its most effective form was after the IDF captured a whole bunch in the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars. The IDF, never known for being picky, upgraded their new tanks with American engines, electronics, guns and even an American style phone on the back so the infantry can talk to the tank commander. If you’ve seen The Beast, a movie set in Afghanistan early in the Soviet invasion, you have seen the IDF T-55. Dale Dye bought two of them for the production through contacts with the IDF. 

The IDF variant of the T-55 is the most interesting and, frankly, a good model for up and coming young insurgent tankers to look at. Soviet combat vehicles are not known for their reliability. The engine life on most the T-series MBTs are insanely short. The V-55 diesel only put out about 80 HP and was a direct descendent of a Soviet dirigible engine that, in 1928, was fairly powerful. By the mid-1950s it was distinctly underpowered and with poor quality control not even reliable.
Luckily for the modern owner of a T-55 there are upgrade packages available. Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building in the Ukraine, for example, offers an engine upgrade for the old T-55 with a multi-fuel power pack capable of something like 850hp. In addition other upgrades are available, including the main gun, electronics and co-axel machine guns. The company is specific that the upgrades can be completed in small workshops with basic lifting equipment, welding and metal cutting. If the specs listed are correct, the modified T-55 will have an across the board performance increase. You can buy T-55s for scrap prices, purchase an upgrade kit and hit up your dad’s garage for a week for a new tank. I wonder what the College Parking committee would say to that



It goes to show that with upgrades the T-55 is still extremely useful for small wars. While it’s no match for Western MBTs it doesn’t really need to be. In a civil conflict, insurgent war or a conflict between two roughly matched opponents a couple of upgraded T-55s would be perfect. The continued use and upgrading of the T-55 also demonstrates how “westernized” our ideas of security are. Sane leaders and commanders realize that the M1A2 and Challenger 2 can annihilate any of their old Soviet tech without even turning off the air conditioner.  But they also know that the possibility of that occurring is remote for the most part unless they go Saddam Hussein or Serbia on somebody. 

For the missions those small states undertake regionally a reliable, upgraded T-55 is fine. In fact, I would argue that’s perfect.  In the west we tend to get caught up in technology and the continual sophistication of military equipment. None of this is needed in conflicts like what we are seeing in Syria and what we have seen in Libya and many other fights in and between small third world states. What IS needed is reliability, low-tech, and easy to maintain. That’s why I wrote this, I think the T-55 provides a good basis for such a beast and it provides a view outside of the western-centric ideal of a technology powered army in regions where high tech can be a hindrance.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

Improvised Weapons, Insurgents and Kickstarting your own Army



Rebellions and insurgencies give rise to a wide array of innovative weapons. The lack of manufacturing capability often leads to some impressive improvised systems.  The famed Technical that was developed in the 1987 Chad-Libyan war is still one of the most popular of the improvised weapons systems. In Syria, Libya and many other more contemporary wars the Technical, which is a small truck of some make with a weapon mounted on the bed, exhibits a wide range of weapons adapted to it.  More advanced Technicals have a heavy machine gun on a pintle mount with gun shield and a seat for the gunner. Highly maneuverable and fairly easy to construct, Technicals are the basis for heavy weapons transport. In Syria the idea has been refined and upgraded a few times. 

Video: BMP-1  73mm Cannon mounted on a large flatbed delivery truck
                Salavged BMP-1 Cannon
 
Video: Syrian Rebel Flatbed Mortar Truck

Video: Another view of the above system
               Mortar Truck #2

The mounting systems are often pretty ingenious as well, this picture of a series of Rebel propaganda photos showing the training of women has one manning a heavy machine gun, probably a Soviet 14.7mm KPV, with what looks like bicycle shock absorbers to cut on the recoil. 


The bigger flatbeds can carry correspondingly heavier ordnance, of course.  I wonder what the recoil does to the frame and suspension of both the smaller pick-ups and the larger flatbeds?  The recoil absorbing mechanisms are seen in quite a few videos and pictures leading me to believe that the effects of firing these weapons erode the vehicle after a while. In addition they would provide a more stable firing platform on a vehicle that was, in all likelihood, never designed to serve as weapons carrier. 

The Syrians have also made quite an industry of homemade mortars

Video:  165mm mortar
               165mm Mortar
Video: Another homemade system, probably 60-80mm in size.

Mortars are one of the best weapons for an insurgency. Cheap, easy to use and deadly effective in most terrain, mortars have been the infantryman’s friend since the American Civil War. While making them is not great technical achievement, making them safe and effective is. And it looks like the Syrians have done just that. 

 Libya during their fighting demonstrated much of the same ingenuity and improvisation (and it makes one wonder how many fighters in the Libyan conflict have migrated to Syria). This photo shows pretty well the Libyan rebels in all their glory, multiple Technicals with heavy machine guns and cannon plus what looks like a homemade rocket launcher on the vehicle closest to the camera. 



Here’s one of my favorite adaptations. The looting of Government arsenals produced a large number of weapon systems adapted for particular uses, like helicopter and strike aircraft mounted rocket pods. But, as the old saying goes, when you have lemons go ahead and made lemonade. I think that the rocket pod mounted on the Technical was a pretty fierce weapon, like a mini version of the Katyusha Rocket launcher made famous during the Second World War



The west concentrates on hi-technology systems, cutting edge weapons that are largely geared towards a conventional conflict with an enemy of roughly equal capability. Despite the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other interventions such as Libya and Mali the most expensive weapons system deviate little from this path. The American F-35 JSF program and the new variant of the Nimitz class super carriers, the Gerald R. Ford, both represent the cutting edge of the western defense industry. These systems represent a substantial investment for America and its allies.
Can we make weapons cheaper? The rise of the maker culture in America (and elsewhere, especially Europe and Japan) could provide a source of inexpensive weapons systems, something that would be the western equivalent of the cobbled together Technicals in the third world.  Besides saving money on defense budgets what I see as the power of the maker could be harnessed to tackle what could be serious issues that came from Iraq/Afghanistan and future conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 

Could western militaries and defense industries take advantage of the maker culture? Could America develop a weapons system designed for small conflicts that would be effective and cheap? A crowd sourced defense project? The Technical and its ilk were built in haste for wars that are most often based on religion, tribal or ethnic beliefs. Taking whatever was available and easy to repair for a war that would necessarily limit the ability to acquire foreign weapons and equipment, the makers of the third world need to be innovative if they want to achieve their goals. Research and development is a luxury that western states can afford; the third world makes do but often in spectacular, innovative fashion. What can the west learn?

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

War isn't funny

War is not funny. Instead, I say it's hilarious. Who would say such a daft thing about an event that it nearly always utterly tragic? Because, as I tell my students, if you don't laugh you'll end up crying.

I am slowly putting together a database of small conflicts of varying types for a much larger project on defeat. This entails lots of small wars in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America. Many of these conflicts are fought on a decidedly small scale with less than 5000 combatants on either side and lots of old Soviet and American equipment. They're also deadly because most are not the result of state on state action but based on tribal, ethnic or religious loyalties. When a war is tribal/ethnic/religious in nature that's your ticket to the sort of black humor that forces you laugh at the absurdity of it all.

Take Libya-Chad, mid-1980s. For nearly 15 years Gaddafi was hard at work trying to make his Southern neighbor into a follower state. Chad was already in disarray from the civil strife that occurred when authoritarian leader Francois Tombalbaye's rather dictatorial handle on things ignited a series of attacks and coup attempts, leading to his assassination in the early '70s.Gaddafi has supported various northern factions with weapons deliveries and, eventually, direct intervention. Chad was, for Muammar, his chance to attain regional hegemony with his oil money. By the early 1980s any stability Libya had brought to Chad dissipated when Libyan Army units were withdrawn to the Aouzou strip, a patch of desert that Gaddafi had forced Chad to succeed. The coalition Government was left to its own devices to fight the former leader, Habre, and his group who had been exiled in Dafur. By 1986-87 Habre and his FAN had succeeded in re-conquering Southern Chad. Best of all, FAN and Habre were dedicated anti-Gaddafi fighters. Habre' then began to transform what had been a 15 year civil struggle into a war of unity against Libyan invaders. Using fast moving battle groups Harbe's FANT (Chadian National Armed Forces) systematically destroyed or forced the withdrawal of all Libyan bases in Northern Chad. Even better, they began to make attacks on airbases deep inside Southern Libya.

Libya-Chad is a gut-buster. Gaddafi rotated his support between several groups and ultimately finds them all united behind an anti-Libyan group that uses Libyan presence as a source of unity. You can't make this up. God, Gaddafi must have been pissed. Think of all that expensive Soviet hardware that was used against Libyan forces, the same hardware Gaddafi has supplied to Chad in the last seven or eight years. That's the best part, all that support was eventually turned against him and used more effectively than Libya could ever hope for.

The 1987 war was appropriately named "The Toyota War" and gave the third world it's most potent weapon: the Technical. Find any pictures from the Libyan Civil War and you'll see hundreds of them with every conceivable weapon mounted. That's irony for you, the very weapon that banished Gaddafi from Chad was also used in his ultimate downfall.

Now there are depressing conflicts, wars that simply are dark with very little humor. The Sudan internal war, for example, is extremely depressing in the never ending massacres, small stakes and the inability for anybody to stop it, or even care. Luckily we have the likes of Gaddafi, Idi Amin, and others to perk us up, make us laugh and realize that we can find that streak of dark humor in war. We just need to look for it.

Thursday, August 30, 2012

Bitcoins, the Rhizome and the Failure of Peer-to-Peer Currency

The bitcoin. In the summer of 2011 the forums on the website "Somethingawful" found the prophets of bitcoin and proceeded to milk them for all the comedy value they were worth. The idea of bitcoin is very interesting: a peer-to-peer, hash generated piece of data that a willing community places a value on. Because it was generated by individuals on their computers the bitcoin theoretically demonstrates something I've discussed before, that is the strength of the rhizome and peer-to-peer networks to bypass control issues imposed by the state. Indeed, that's how the currency first came to the attention of the users of Somethingawful: bitcoins are a primary method of payment for a website called "Silk Road", where users could purchase drugs through mail order. Bitcoins were untraceable, anonymous and consequently perfect for small, illegal transactions.

 The problem is that such a network relies on the user with no regulating authority. Or, to put it differently, there is a regulating body with no authority as users start groups that attempt to introduce order. And few of the users who have been mining bitcoins do not want any sort of regulation to what they perhaps see as a vast playground where money can be conjured out of thin air and traded through exchanges set up by other users. Unfortunately the problems plaguing bitcoin mostly stem from this anarchical state.

 Throughout the Summer of 2011 exchanges were hacked, users outright scammed by other users and the value of bitcoins went high, only to crash back down when speculators decided to cash out. The unstable market coincided with the unstable security of the existing exchanges, both of which were hacked. Essentially, if you invest large amounts into bitcoin it seems you need to be prepared to lose most of it.

 The bitcoin saga emphasizes one major point about conducting business over a rhizome based peer-to-peer system: there needs to be some sort of regulating body, preferably not market based and preferably not invested in the article it is regulating. I think that a peer-to-peer system like I discuss elsewhere as a rhizome works for the free exchange of media and culture but would fail without appreciate oversight in replacing state backed currency. Bitcoin is fascinating but not ready for a broader usage and perhaps never will be. 

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

Native America and Solar Power

We had a discussion in class about solar power and how Native American reservations are taking advantage of their location to set up solar arrays. Solar power and sustainable energy constructs could pave a way ahead for many native tribes. Why?

1. More sustainable economically than casinos: Sure, they may require thinking in the long term, but a plan to copy the Navajo and place solar arrays on tribal land is a sure thing from an economic standpoint. Casinos are vulnerable to economic downturns; energy is far less vulnerable and far more steady; everybody needs power.

2. Works for tribes without a viable casino location: Who wants to go to Pine Ridge for a holiday of gambling? Instead, Pine Ridge, and other plains and desert reservations, could begin to invest in services that surrounding states and communities require. A win/win for power companies and the tribe.

3. Make use of extensive tribal land: Much tribal land is useless for just about everything....except things like wind and solar units. Why not make use of this terrain for something profitable?

Here's a final thought: what if the tribes began to come together, with wealthier ones investing in wind and solar units in reservations unable to meet the initial investment. Further, the green power initiative by the Federal Government could give grants to tribes, with appropriate oversight. A significant growth in power production by Native American tribes would also give an addition to the meaning of "Made in the USA". A economically unified native community within the US and Canada would be beneficial, I think, on both sides of the line. Green and sustainable energy, economic benefits and a unified sense of native community.

In the roleplaying game Shadowrun the native tribes are powerful, unified and possess a significant say in how their country is run. In the game world they have magic...in the real world that could be the future of solar and wind power.