Logisitcs in Small Wars: Fighting on a budget

The old adage that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics is never more clearly expressed than in small conflict. The ability to support the force on the battlefield plays a vital, perhaps the most vital, role in achieving victory or suffering defeat. Logistics can be defined as “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied” (Van Creveld 1994). This deceptively simple phrasing masks the incredible effort that moving and supplying armies that small states face. Bravery on the battlefield matters little if the most basic elements of human need are ignored, not to mention munitions and supplies for the weapons of war. As Rommel found in North Africa, battlefield victory brings an increased need to find new points of supply. When the Africa Corps was forced to stretch already weak supply chains the opening for Allied victory appeared. In wars between small states the ability to move and supply armies is critical but often left behind in the acquisition of better military technology and larger armies. 

Most small states face a stark choice: supply your armies or improve your armies. The ability for an army to live off the land disappeared in 1914 with ever increasing demand for fuel, food and munitions to feed the art of modern warfare (Van Creveld 1994). For many leaders the choice is obvious but the underlying danger means that any stated goals must be achieved quickly before a tenuous supply line is outpaced. This rarely occurs and the failure many small states experience in achieving stated war goals can be traced directly to poor logistics. 

The Chaco War and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict demonstrate that raw manpower and more numerous but less advanced technology matters little if they cannot be adequately supplied. The focus of the Chaco War, the Chaco region between Paraguay and Bolivia, was an arid wasteland devoid of significant sources of water. This most basic necessity was brought in by transport by both belligerents while the only major source of water was a major strategic objective for both sides. The Bolivian Army was based on modern European ideas of combined arms, with limitations allowed for budget. Bolivia and Paraguay were the two poorest states in the region and while both suffered logistical issues, Bolivia’s more modern Army suffered far worse from the poor logistical situation. The lack of trucks meant that the commanders in the Gran Chaco had a choice: keep the tanks running or get water to the troops. Issues with water were to prove a major disability with Bolivian forces with thousands of troops surrendering due to dehydration to Paraguay (Hughes 2005) (Facrcau 1996). Bolivia also faces another disadvantage with a poor road infrastructure and a geographically long distance from the battlespace. As Hughes notes in his excellent study of the logistics of the Chaco War the distance from the capital (La Paz) to the battlespace was nearly a 1000 miles with only half that covered by railroad. The remainder was composed of broken and narrow roads through impossibly rugged terrain (Hughes 2005, p. 426). Paraguay, in contrast, suffered many of the same issues but with a smaller army and less technology transport was somewhat eased. In addition Paraguay had the added advantage of a Navy on the river Paraguay that provided yeomen service in the supply of the field army. 

China suffered many identical issues in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. One author describes Chinese logistical capability as being a serious problem (Chen 1983). The ratio of trucks to troops was low even with Chinese emphasis on waging a “low-tech” conflict. With little air transport and facing rugged terrain that split their forces into ever smaller sub-units, the Chinese were forced to rely on requisitioned trucks, livestock (donkeys) and hired laborers to maintain their supply lines. This concept of logistics followed the Chinese theory of “manpower over weapons” that stemmed from Mao’s concept of a “People’s War”.  While modernization was certainly pushed in China prior to the conflict the Army remained in 1979 a “People’s Army” and possessed a logistical capability that reflected this period of development (Chen 1983). The Vietnamese view of Chinese logistics was part of Hanoi’s assertion that China was “incapable of a large scale, protracted war of aggression” (Porter 1984). 

Supplying troops with munitions and rations is often difficult for small and less developed states. This difficulty is compounded when operating modern military equipment, especially an air force. After overcoming the hurdle in obtaining modern arms and equipment, states will need to repair and maintain it. Iran after the 1979 revolution and Ethiopia in the Ogaden War both suffered when their supply of munitions and parts ran low for their American built machines (Cordesman 1991) (Tareke 2000). The Somalis suffered the same fate for their Soviet built arsenal after expelling Soviet advisors and severing all ties to the second world in November of 1977 (Tareke 2000). The Somalis had gambled on receiving American assistance to fill the void but this did not occur until after the end of hostilities. Until March of 1978 Somali was at a major disadvantage while Ethiopia received not only massive amounts of Soviet arms and assistance but also nearly 18,000 Cuban troops from Cuba and from the Cuban mission in Angola (Tareke 2000). 

Four major issues plague small states in regards to logistics. 

-First is limited or underdeveloped infrastructure. Without the ability to transport supplies into the battle space even well stocked quartermasters can render a defeat. 

-Second is the transport itself. While trucks can be overlooked for additional tank, the truck is more important in many ways, as Bolivia found out in the Chaco War with the stark choice to transport water or fuel. Air transport is generally regarded as something only a major power with a substantial budget can undertake, no matter a small state with extremely limited resources. 

- Third is sustainment. This is a combination of the state’s ability to supply its forces beyond the initial period of war and long term options for supply and munitions of units in the battlespace. In many small conflicts both belligerents experience this. Iran’s logistical system in the wake of the revolution was absolutely chaotic and actually supplying the troops on the frontlines proved difficult due to the inability to locate stocks of parts, equipment, and munitions (Cordesman 1991). 

-Fourth and finally is a state’s ability to service and maintain modern machines of war. The Chaco War first demonstrated the need for competent foreign technical assistant with issues surrounding Bolivia’s representatives from their major arms supplier, Vickers.  Hughes describes one of the few Vickers representatives in Bolivia as unable to speak Spanish and, quoting the British Legation, “totally out of his depth” (Hughes 2005). Complex weapons demand training and assistance, something not always available to small states in a world of shifting international politics and preferences. 

Logistics is an art form; the ability to deliver men and material to the battlespace is an essential attribute in any conflict, no matter how limited. Often small states are forced to choose between logistics and weapons systems. The outcome of this choice will very often dictate the course of a conflict.