Logisitcs in Small Wars: Fighting on a budget

The old adage that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics is never more clearly expressed than in small conflict. The ability to support the force on the battlefield plays a vital, perhaps the most vital, role in achieving victory or suffering defeat. Logistics can be defined as “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied” (Van Creveld 1994). This deceptively simple phrasing masks the incredible effort that moving and supplying armies that small states face. Bravery on the battlefield matters little if the most basic elements of human need are ignored, not to mention munitions and supplies for the weapons of war. As Rommel found in North Africa, battlefield victory brings an increased need to find new points of supply. When the Africa Corps was forced to stretch already weak supply chains the opening for Allied victory appeared. In wars between small states the ability to move and supply armies is critical but often left behind in the acquisition of better military technology and larger armies. 

Most small states face a stark choice: supply your armies or improve your armies. The ability for an army to live off the land disappeared in 1914 with ever increasing demand for fuel, food and munitions to feed the art of modern warfare (Van Creveld 1994). For many leaders the choice is obvious but the underlying danger means that any stated goals must be achieved quickly before a tenuous supply line is outpaced. This rarely occurs and the failure many small states experience in achieving stated war goals can be traced directly to poor logistics. 

The Chaco War and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict demonstrate that raw manpower and more numerous but less advanced technology matters little if they cannot be adequately supplied. The focus of the Chaco War, the Chaco region between Paraguay and Bolivia, was an arid wasteland devoid of significant sources of water. This most basic necessity was brought in by transport by both belligerents while the only major source of water was a major strategic objective for both sides. The Bolivian Army was based on modern European ideas of combined arms, with limitations allowed for budget. Bolivia and Paraguay were the two poorest states in the region and while both suffered logistical issues, Bolivia’s more modern Army suffered far worse from the poor logistical situation. The lack of trucks meant that the commanders in the Gran Chaco had a choice: keep the tanks running or get water to the troops. Issues with water were to prove a major disability with Bolivian forces with thousands of troops surrendering due to dehydration to Paraguay (Hughes 2005) (Facrcau 1996). Bolivia also faces another disadvantage with a poor road infrastructure and a geographically long distance from the battlespace. As Hughes notes in his excellent study of the logistics of the Chaco War the distance from the capital (La Paz) to the battlespace was nearly a 1000 miles with only half that covered by railroad. The remainder was composed of broken and narrow roads through impossibly rugged terrain (Hughes 2005, p. 426). Paraguay, in contrast, suffered many of the same issues but with a smaller army and less technology transport was somewhat eased. In addition Paraguay had the added advantage of a Navy on the river Paraguay that provided yeomen service in the supply of the field army. 

China suffered many identical issues in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. One author describes Chinese logistical capability as being a serious problem (Chen 1983). The ratio of trucks to troops was low even with Chinese emphasis on waging a “low-tech” conflict. With little air transport and facing rugged terrain that split their forces into ever smaller sub-units, the Chinese were forced to rely on requisitioned trucks, livestock (donkeys) and hired laborers to maintain their supply lines. This concept of logistics followed the Chinese theory of “manpower over weapons” that stemmed from Mao’s concept of a “People’s War”.  While modernization was certainly pushed in China prior to the conflict the Army remained in 1979 a “People’s Army” and possessed a logistical capability that reflected this period of development (Chen 1983). The Vietnamese view of Chinese logistics was part of Hanoi’s assertion that China was “incapable of a large scale, protracted war of aggression” (Porter 1984). 

Supplying troops with munitions and rations is often difficult for small and less developed states. This difficulty is compounded when operating modern military equipment, especially an air force. After overcoming the hurdle in obtaining modern arms and equipment, states will need to repair and maintain it. Iran after the 1979 revolution and Ethiopia in the Ogaden War both suffered when their supply of munitions and parts ran low for their American built machines (Cordesman 1991) (Tareke 2000). The Somalis suffered the same fate for their Soviet built arsenal after expelling Soviet advisors and severing all ties to the second world in November of 1977 (Tareke 2000). The Somalis had gambled on receiving American assistance to fill the void but this did not occur until after the end of hostilities. Until March of 1978 Somali was at a major disadvantage while Ethiopia received not only massive amounts of Soviet arms and assistance but also nearly 18,000 Cuban troops from Cuba and from the Cuban mission in Angola (Tareke 2000). 

Four major issues plague small states in regards to logistics. 

-First is limited or underdeveloped infrastructure. Without the ability to transport supplies into the battle space even well stocked quartermasters can render a defeat. 

-Second is the transport itself. While trucks can be overlooked for additional tank, the truck is more important in many ways, as Bolivia found out in the Chaco War with the stark choice to transport water or fuel. Air transport is generally regarded as something only a major power with a substantial budget can undertake, no matter a small state with extremely limited resources. 

- Third is sustainment. This is a combination of the state’s ability to supply its forces beyond the initial period of war and long term options for supply and munitions of units in the battlespace. In many small conflicts both belligerents experience this. Iran’s logistical system in the wake of the revolution was absolutely chaotic and actually supplying the troops on the frontlines proved difficult due to the inability to locate stocks of parts, equipment, and munitions (Cordesman 1991). 

-Fourth and finally is a state’s ability to service and maintain modern machines of war. The Chaco War first demonstrated the need for competent foreign technical assistant with issues surrounding Bolivia’s representatives from their major arms supplier, Vickers.  Hughes describes one of the few Vickers representatives in Bolivia as unable to speak Spanish and, quoting the British Legation, “totally out of his depth” (Hughes 2005). Complex weapons demand training and assistance, something not always available to small states in a world of shifting international politics and preferences. 

Logistics is an art form; the ability to deliver men and material to the battlespace is an essential attribute in any conflict, no matter how limited. Often small states are forced to choose between logistics and weapons systems. The outcome of this choice will very often dictate the course of a conflict.

The Failure of Soviet Advisors in Afghanistan

The Soviet effort in Afghanistan is an example of how a potentially successful advisory effort failed because of the identity of the assisting country.  The Soviets installed advisors at in the Afghani General Staff down to the battalion level.[1] At the lowest levels many Soviet advisors faced cultural and language issues: similar problems that plague advisory missions throughout history. However many Soviet advisors were aghast at the inability of their host unit to undertake specific missions leading to the advisors assuming direct command of their Afghan Army unit. In addition Soviet advisors often uncritically took the advice of their advisees. These attributes, and some others, added up to a near paralysis in the Afghani army and an over reliance on the Soviet advisor contingent.[2]

 

The Soviet failure with the Afghani Army was also rooted in the unwillingness of many Afghan troops to absorb the norms being taught. One captured rebel fighter said of the better trained and Soviet advised troops that their “tactics were to shoot indiscriminately than flee”. [3] The Army’s poor state of equipment, weapons, hygiene and rations represented an immediate need that many Soviet Advisors, as above, attended to personally. Organizationally the embedded Soviet advisors were entirely separate from the operations of 40^th Army in country and lacked a coordinating chain of command for different advisors in separate units. In the large Afghan units it was not uncommon to see Soviet Advisors take over meetings and planning sessions while their advisees stood behind them, often the Soviet would argue amongst themselves as well. One primary reason for this hijacking of command by the nominal unit advisor was the Soviet model of accountability. If an Afghan unit failed it was often the advisor that took the brunt of blame and with it possible loss of rank and privileges. Like many other facets of Soviet society many advisors sought to perverse their own reputation in order to transfer back to the regular forces rather than risk punishment for actions that were essentially out of their hands.[4]

 

The Soviets had some success with Afghan Special Forces, namely the KhAD (secret police) and the creation of a gendarme.[5] The creation of these forces also played on the strength the Soviets possessed in the creation and training of specialized groups of troops to undertake special missions. The KhAD and Afghan police also benefited from increased Soviet provided training, equipment and weapons.  Despite the success of Afghan Special Forces little thought was given to the primary COIN mission of the Afghan Army. The development and maintenance of a militia that functioned outside the nominal chain of command was only partially a success due to infiltration by mujahedin and lack of essential tools, such as weapons and training. Militias were a Soviet political project and, once more, separate from the military advisors attached to the Afghan Army. 

Soviet advisory efforts failed after the withdrawal of the 40^th Army. Afghani efforts against the mujahedin relied on Soviet fire and air support which went away after the withdrawal. The ready availability of equipment led to an exceedingly poor maintenance record in Afghan units and fuel was a widespread problem throughout the war. [6] The Afghanis were generally unwilling to perform independent operations and this led to a failure in the transfer of control for many regions in the country. Once Soviet money dried up once and for all in 1992 the days of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were numbered. 

The Soviet effort highlights how advisory missions, even well supported ones, fail. By applying norms from the Soviet experience to the Afghans the Soviets failed to take into account local issues of recruitment, training and culture. This led to exceedingly high desertions rates in DRA units that were often riddled with tribal loyalties. These loyalties would conflict with the war in general: many troops were conscripted and more than willing to desert to a familiar tribe, even if that tribe was part of the mujahedin. The conflicting chain of command between 40^th Army and the Soviet advisory effort made coordination difficult.  Soviet combined arms tactics require coordination at the lowest levels but exercising these in Afghanistan was made more difficult by the relatively high placement of Soviet Advisors (battalion level) and the separate command structures. The level of Soviet control proved another factor in the failure of the Afghanis after 1988. As noted previously the Soviet preferred to directly command their units rather than risk failure from an advisory role. This notion encouraged Afghan units to not conduct independent operations without Soviet combat units supporting them. This extended to the Afghani Air Force as well: the poor training and conditions of pilots led to an over-reliance of Soviet air assets. Soviet advisors fought the war as though they were in control, rather than preparing their advisees to operate independently. This extended to how they fought the war and the failure of Soviet tactics rather than the adaptation of local methods to fight the mujahedin

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[1] Kalinovsky, Artemy. The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, COIN and Nation-building in Afghanistan. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #60, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

[2] Kalinovsky, p. 20

[3] Oliker, Olga. Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010. P. 15

[4] Oliker, p. 47

[5] Oliker, p. 30-35.

[6] Oliker, p. 52

Post Crimea Space Cooperation: Finding a new ride.

US/Russian space cooperation has been an important part of space politics since 1996 and the placement of American Astronauts on Mir. Russian support has been essential to the International Space Station with the expense of the shuttle program (and after the Columbia disaster in 2003). Since the retirement of the shuttle program Russian support has been essential. The American space program is currently experiencing an odd “in-between” period with the continued development of a new launch system and the still-baby steps of private space contractors. The factor covering these is the dependable Souyz launch system and Russian cooperation. This looks to be in jeopardy with tensions over the Crimea. This, of course, raises a few different issues involving how Americans are going to get into orbit. Private contractors have proven they are able to launch supply flights into low-orbit. NASA is still developing the Orion launch system and the first unmanned flight is planned for September, 2014. I see a few options and none of them are cheap:

-Accelerate the development of Orion: This would require giving NASA more money, and with Congress unable to agree on anything these days I don’t see this happening. 

-Accelerate the development of private space venture: The existing space companies, like Space X, have launch systems that can support manned flight. The Space X system, named Dragon, is planning its first manned flight in 2015. 

-Kiss and make up to the Russians, or at least separate space from foreign policy: The shakiest option, especially as tensions continue to rise. Hitching a ride with the Russians after the rhetoric that has been exchanged over Crimea would be awkward to say the least. Very, very awkward. Sort of like calling your ex for a ride from a bar after a really, really, really bad break-up.

-Find somebody else: Of other space programs, only China currently has a manned flight capability and not only are they strategic partners to the Russians but questions arise to the capability to replace the Russians. From what I’ve read, probably not, even if a partnership could be formed, which most likely will not happen anyway.

The US has two options, deal with foreign policy and space or pump cash into NASA and private space companies. On the other side, the loss of American money from the Russian space program could seriously hurt it as well. The American infusion of cash has played a significant part in keeping the Russians above water; the loss of this money could very well see the Russian program scaled back significantly. Cooperation in space is not just sound policy but budgetary as well. Program cuts have seen both sides rely upon the other.  Essentially, cutting the space cooperation will hurt both states but in the right circumstances this could be a shot in the arm for the American public and private space programs

2014 Crimean Emergency

There will be some consequences and possible actions that everybody has available to them.

The Russians:

-Long Term Economic Consequences: Early March is seeing the ruble take a nosedive on the world markets. Investors are dumping their rubles and, as the market does, many follow. If the Ukraine wanted to really play along, dumping their rubles would hurt the Russians in the place it will ultimately hurt most: the pocket book. In addition many Russians are buying dollars, further increasing the disparity. 

-The cost, as of March 3^rd, for the Russian attack is running at 10 billion. It costs some serious money to mount a full scale land, sea and air attack on even a neighboring country. How long can Russia sustain this expense?

-Why? Putin doesn’t want a NATO or EU ally on his western border. The Crimean Emergency follows the general pattern of the 2008 South Ossetia war except for one important aspect; Ukraine did not take the first shot. Georgia was both an expectant member of NATO and a close ally of the west. Russia likes its buffer states, a lot. It’s also losing them at a fairly fast rate, which historically has never been good for Russian security. 

-Opportunity: Ukrainian domestic strife was Putin’s green light to accomplish something he had put on the radar years ago. Encouragement of pro-Russian activity certainly had been going on before the official movement of the military began. Ukraine’s cultural, ethnic and linguistic situation places it between the west and the east and made the step of taking over the very Russian Crimea easy. What counts is how the Ukrainian military handles it. 

-What Putin can do to solidify his hold: The smart bet would be to call for a vote from the residents of the Crimea. Certainly this will go in favor of Russia, judging from the initial reaction by residents of the Crimea. It would give Putin political leverage and make Ukraine’s position less sound.

At 9EST the Russian ultimatum for Ukrainian forces to abandon their posts in the Crimea is set to expire. What happens next will determine the character of this emergency. 

Ukraine: 

-Ukrainian Capability: As of 3/3 the Ukrainian military is mobilizing its reserves. It’s not a large force, and certainly smaller than the RFR military. But it’s also concentrated in a far, far smaller area and Russia has other security concerns that, in all likelihood, put the military capability at near parity. The Ukrainian military is not as advanced but they would also put up a fight if Putin decided to mount a larger attack. The disparity in technology will have less effect on the defenders than the attackers. 

-Play it Cool: So far the Ukrainian reaction has been political, not military. They need to let the Russians act first. This will get them more political capital in whatever road they pursue. The status of the Crimea and its semi-autonomous status quite possibly play a part in this; it was easier to let go, at least in the short term. 

-Partition: Realistically Ukraine could just partition itself out, the east going to Russia and the West going with the EU. Practically, this won’t happen unless the state calls for a vote. Ukrainian nationalism is a very real thing and the eastern half of the country isn’t as pro-Russian as the Crimea. The last time a nation tried to remove itself from the state was Croatia and the resulting Yugoslav Civil War was devastating.  Several pundits have discussed this option but unless a popular vote overwhelmingly demands it, it most likely is a non-option. 

-Use Force: Not a good option. Offensive action would quite possibly stretch the Ukrainians past their breaking point as well as dilute the, hopefully, forthcoming aid packages from the west. The Ukrainian military has been under a series of reforms since 2013 and this has reduced their total numbers by around 40,000 as well as made the military an all-volunteer force. This was done as a cost saving measure.

The West and the rest:

-NATO: The best course of action is no action beyond political and economic support. If Putin would go further, and I believe he won’t, some could compare this to NATO’s inaction in 1956 during the Hungarian Uprising. But in the age of globalization and interdependence, using NATO’s economic power to sanction Russia would be a far better course of action. NATO traditionally wants to not escalate a situation in Europe. Any direct military intervention here would be just that. 

-European Union: Again, a political and  economic response would be more devastating to Russia than any military action. 

-As of 3/3 Poland was conducting a limited mobilization towards its eastern border. This is more likely done in response to a potential refugee issue than any Russian threat. Neither Romania nor Hungary has overtly moved more troops but this could and probably will change if refugee issues threaten to become a problem. 

-The US quite probably made a mistake with the language it used on 2/28 and 3/1. The ability to deliver severe consequences will be necessarily very limited. In a military sense Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, located about 25 miles northwest of the Black Sea city of Constanta and about 2,500 miles northwest of Afghanistan could serve as a potential asset, depending of course on how the Romanians view the situation. But military force is not the answer here. Economic sanctions and political maneuvering is a far better alternative. The Obama doctrine which is to plan, execute, follow but not lead, should once more take precedence here. Let the EU/NATO make the move with US support on the back end. 

-The Snowden addendum: I wonder if the issues with US intelligence and the flat footed response are because of the loss of intelligence assets on the ground in Russia due to the Snowden leaks. Snowden compromised far more than simply the NSA spying. He also, most likely, compromised US intelligence world-wide and then fled to one of the more repressive regimes in the region. It’s not a stretch of the imagination that the RFR could have used intelligence provided by Snowden to fix leaks and compromised intelligence.  Just a thought and I have seen absolutely nothing to back it up.     

The Crimean Emergency is power politics in an era of interdependence where aggression by a large power will not pay the same dividends it did a century ago. Russia, and by default Putin, may have taken one step too far. While further military action with western states is very unlikely, economic repercussions are. Russia’s economy is not the strongest to begin with and the cost of military action, the cost of supplying the Crimea (which obtains most of its goods and services from Ukraine via land routes) and already occurring devaluation of the ruble the further, long term consequences could be devastating.  But the already strengthening national spirit in Russia will most likely give Putin a free hand to pursue whatever policy he’s willing to risk in the coming days, weeks and months.I'll try to update in the coming days and see how wrong I am.

The F-35: Gucci in a Filson World

The F-35 has been a source of controversy for a few years now. A fifth generation multi-role fighter developed to replace aging (and not so aging in the case of the F-22) airframes across the DoD, the F-35 seemingly falls into the trap of trying to please everybody and thus pleasing nobody. A recent article in Defense News (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140204/DEFREG03/302040018?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter) discusses the F-35 and Japan. Japan has been on the verge for a while of officially re-acquiring its armed forces and upping its capability in the face of a perceived Chinese threat. In a recent interview the PM, Abe, noted that the relationship between China and Japan mirrors that of the UK and Germany on the eve of the First World War, an interesting statement as the centennial dawns. Originally I saw signs that the Japanese intended to make the F-35 a cornerstone of a new stance on security. This stance would assume more of a partnership role with the US without actually displacing it in the East Asian power structure. The SDF likes, loves actually, next generation western weapons systems; the F-35 is just one example. 

The point here is that if the JSF is going so far over-budget for the SDF that they are starting to have second thoughts while cutting their order, what does this mean for the US? The Marines already have one operational squadron with the special VTOL capability. Delivery is starting to commence with the Navy and Air Force. And questions already exist about the ability of the F-35 to improve upon existing Super Hornet and Raptor airframes. One engine vs. two, shorter range and smaller payload; that’s just the beginning of the capability issues many have raised against the JSF. Canada is also having second thoughts and with a renewed emphasis on Arctic security those basic capability issues may limit the ability of the RCAF to design effective mission profiles for their northern territory. 

I saw the JSF acquisition as a symbol of Japanese resurgence in the East Asian power structure. But is it really? It’s obviously more advanced than anything the Chinese possess. Perhaps that’s the problem, the dazzlingly advanced technology is not enough to offset the cost and the fact that the SDF could operate with something like the Eurofighter or the Gripen. But the alliance with the US pretty much ensures that that will not happen, barring some unforeseen circumstance. The F-35, for all its issues, is going to come. I only wonder what is on the drawing board to replace it.